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AC 01/10
01 May, 2010

Advisory Circular to Air Operators

GUIDANCE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FLIGHT DATA ANALYSIS (FDA) PROGRAMME

1. PURPOSE

- a. This Advisory Circular provides information and guidance to air operators and DCA staff for the establishment of a Flight Data Analysis (FDA) programme.

2. RELATED CIVIL AVIATION REGULATIONS

- a. Myanmar Aircraft Rules (1937).
- b. Myanmar Civil Aircraft Requirements Part – 8 (Operations)

3. BACKGROUND

- a. A Flight Data Analysis (FDA) programme is a pro-active and non-punitive programme for gathering and analyzing data recorded during routine flights to improve aviation safety. (Such programmes may also be called Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) or Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) or similar.) FDA programmes are an integral component of a mature safety management system. The use of this important safety tool is increasing as technology improvements expand the capabilities for gathering and analyzing such recorded data. Random collection and analysis of data provides valuable information to improve safety with the ultimate aim of reducing the number of accidents. The information and insights provided by FDA can improve safety by identifying safety hazards, enhancing training effectiveness, and improve operational, maintenance, engineering, and air traffic control procedures.
- b. Recognizing the accident prevention potential of FDA programmes, Amendment 26 to ICAO Annex 6, Part I requires that, from 1 January 2005, an operator of an aeroplane of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 27 000 kg shall establish and maintain a flight data analysis programme as part of its accident prevention and flight safety programme.

4. SCOPE

- a. The scope of this AC is to provide guidance to DCA and air operator staff for the implementation of an effective Flight Data Analysis programme.

5. Objectives of a FDA programme

- a. To identify undesirable and unsafe trends;
- b. The identification of operational hazards in specific procedures, fleet, airports and air traffic control procedures;
- c. To determine the frequency of occurrences which when combined with an estimation of the level of severity, provide for an assessment of the safety risks involved in order to determine which may become unacceptable if the trend continues;
- d. To put in place appropriate risk mitigation measures to alleviate any present or predicted unacceptable risk;
- e. To monitor results of mitigation measures and to adjust such measures as required; and

- f. To verify and optimize the effectiveness of training programmes and SOPs.

6. Basic Requirements of a FDA Programme

- a. The manager of an operator's FDA programme, is responsible for identifying issues of concern and for informing the manager responsible for the process concerned. The latter is accountable for taking appropriate and practicable safety action within a reasonable period of time.

Note: While an operator may contract the operation of a flight data analysis programme to another party, the overall responsibility for the FDA programme remains with the manager of the air operator's Flight Safety Programme.

- b. In a FDA program, recorded data is removed from the aircraft by several methods, such as Quick Access Recorders (QAR) or directly from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR). The recorded data is periodically retrieved and sent to the air operators FDA office for analysis. This office usually resides within the flight safety organization at the air operator. The data is then verified and analyzed, utilizing specialized processing and analysis software designed to convert the flight data into usable information.
- c. The analysis software extracts FDA events from the raw data, based on parameters and associated threshold values (e.g., descent rate in excess of 1000 feet per minute on approach) that are specified by the air operator. Events are normally filtered by phase of flight. The analysis typically focuses on events that fall outside normal operating boundaries, as determined by the air operator's operational standards, as well as the aircraft manufacturer's limitations. The FDA office then reviews the events to assess their validity and their potential significance.
- d. Unless an FDA event requires immediate action in the interest of safety, significant FDA events will be aggregated for further review by an oversight committee typically comprised of representatives from the appropriate air operator departments, such as flight operations, flight standards and training, and aircraft maintenance as well as representative(s) of flight crews.
- e. Data that could identify flight crewmembers are removed from the electronic record as part of the initial event extraction process. However, FDA programs typically include a crew liaison officer who is normally provided with a secure means of determining crew identity to enable follow-up inquiry and feedback with a particular flight crew concerning a particular FDA event. The crew liaison officer should be someone who has the confidence of crewmembers and managers for their integrity and good judgment. This person provides the link between fleet or training managers and the flight crew involved, in circumstances highlighted by FDA.
- f. Appendix A outlines examples of typical events which could be included in an air operator's FDA programme.

7. APPLICABILITY

Air operators should consider the information contained in this AC when developing their FDA programmes.

Examples of Typical FDA Programme Exceedance Detection and Routine Parameter Analysis

1. Traditional Event Set

These operational events are typical of those found in most software packages; however events should be tailored to the specific needs/peculiarities of the air operator and its operation.

| Event Group | Event Code | Description |
|-------------------------------|------------|---|
| Flight Manual Speed Limits | 01A | Vmo exceedance |
| | 02A | Mmo exceedance |
| | 03A | Flap placard speed exceedance |
| | 03G | Gear down speed exceedance |
| | 03I | Gear up/down selected speed exceedance |
| Flight Manual Altitude Limits | 04 | Exceedance of flap/ slat altitude |
| | 05 | Exceedance of maximum operating altitude |
| High Approach Speeds | 06A | Approach speed high within 90 sec of touchdown |
| | 06B | Approach speed high below 500 ft AAL |
| | 06C | Approach speed high below 50 ft AGL |
| Low Approach Speed | 07A | Approach speed low within 2 minutes of touchdown |
| High Climb-out Speeds | 08A | Climb out speed high below 400 ft AAL |
| | 08B | Climb out speed high 400 ft AAL to 1000 ft AAL |
| Low Climb-out Speeds | 08C | Climb out speed low 35 ft AGL to 400 ft AAL |
| | 08D | Climb out speed low 400 ft AAL to 1500 ft AAL |
| Take-off Pitch | 09A | Pitch rate high on take-off |
| Unstick Speeds | 10A | Un-stick speed high |
| | 10B | Un-stick speed low |
| Pitch | 20A | Pitch attitude high during take-off |
| | 20B | Abnormal pitch landing (high) |
| | 20C | Abnormal pitch landing (low) |
| Bank Angles | 21A | Excessive bank below 100 ft AGL |
| | 21B | Excessive bank 100 ft AGL to 500 ft AAL |
| | 21C | Excessive bank above 500 ft AGL |
| | 21D | Excessive bank near ground (below 20 ft AGL) |
| Height Loss in Climb-out | 22D | Initial climb height loss 20 ft AGL to 400 ft AAL |
| | 22E | Initial climb height loss 400 ft to 1500 ft AAL |
| Slow Climb-out | 22F | Excessive time to 1000 ft AAL after take-off |
| High Rate of Descent | 22G | High rate of descent below 2000 ft AGL |
| Normal Acceleration | 23A | High normal acceleration on ground |
| | 23B | High normal acceleration in flight flaps up/down |
| | 23C | High normal acceleration at landing |
| | 23D | Normal acceleration; hard bounced landing |
| Low go-around | 024 | Go-around below 200 ft |
| RTO | 026 | High Speed Rejected take-off |
| Configuration | 40C | Abnormal configuration; speed brake with flap |
| Low Approach | 042 | Low on approach |
| | 43A | Speed-brake on approach below 800 ft AAL |
| Ground Proximity Warning | 43B | Speed-brake not armed below 800 ft AAL (any flap) |
| | 44A | GPWS operation - hard warning |
| | 44B | GPWS operation - soft warning |
| | 44C | GPWS operation - false warning |
| Margin to Stall | 44D | GPWS operation – wind-shear warning |
| | 45A | Reduced lift margin except near ground |
| | 45B | Reduced lift margin at take-off |
| | 46A | Stick-shake |
| Configuration | 46B | False stick-shake |
| | 047 | Early configuration change after take-off (flap) |
| Landing Flap | 48A | Late land flap (not in position below 500 ft AAL) |
| | 48B | Reduced flap landing |
| | 48D | Flap load relief system operation |
| Glideslope | 56A | Deviation under glide-slope |
| | 56B | Deviation above glide-slope (below 600 ft AGL) |
| Buffet Margin | 061 | Low buffet margin (above 20,000 ft) |
| Approach Power | 75A | Low power on approach |

2. New Operational Event Program Triggers

In addition to the traditional events detailed above there could be a number of new events used to detect other situations which an air operator may be interested in. Some of the new triggers are relatively simple to implement while others would need careful coding and research to avoid false events while still activating against good data.

| Description | Notes |
|---|--|
| Engine parameter exceedance (eg. TGT etc) | One of a range of engine monitors |
| Full and free control checks not carried out | Essential pilot actions and a measure of control transducers. |
| Taxi out to take-off time - more than (x) minutes | Can be measured against a standard time for that airfield and runway. |
| High Normal Acceleration -Rough taxi-way | Detection along with an estimate of position derived from groundspeed and heading. |
| High Longitudinal Acceleration - Heavy braking | as above |
| Excessive Taxi Speed | as above |
| Take-off configuration warning | |
| Landing gear in transit longer than (x) seconds | To be used as an indicator of system problems and wear |
| Flap/slats in transit longer than (x) seconds | as above |
| Master Warning | All master warnings, even if false, heard by the crew are a useful indicator of distractions and "mundane/known problems". |
| Engine failure | To determine crew performance as well as help technical investigation. |
| Autopilot vertical speed mode selected below (x) ft | One of a range of auto flight system usage monitors |
| Fuel Remaining at landing below minimums | |
| Airborne holding - more than (x) minutes | |
| Excessive control movement - airborne (especially rudder) | This will indicate control problems that other events might not identify |
| TCAS warning | A must for monitoring future significant hazards and crew reactions |
| Reverse thrust not used on landing | |
| Auto ground spoiler not selected for landing | |
| Landing to shutdown time - more than (x) minutes | Indicates taxiway or stand allocation problems |